The objective of this paper is a presentation of results of an analysis of the Three Seas Initiative (TSI), whose participating countries (except Austria) treat it as a method of: a) reducing their dependence on crude oil and natural gas imports from Russia, thus increasing their energy security; b) accelerated filling of the persisting civilisation gap between the initiative participants and more developed EU countries owing to the improved quality and maturity of the transport and digital North-South infrastructure; and c) the actual implementation of the "vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace." The analysis has assumed the following research hypothesis: The CEE states' joining the EU has not markedly changed those states' development, as material differences do still exist in this respect between the new EU states and the old ones, which was verified positively.
Introduction

While the Berlin Wall fell in 1989
1 , most post-communist countries were admitted to the European Union only 15 years later 2 and 56 years after the launch of the Marshall Plan 3 . This attests to the scale of the challenges faced by those countries in terms of both economy and geopolitics. This analysis assumes the following research hypothesis: The CEE states' joining the EU has not markedly changed those states' development, as material differences do still exist in this respect between the new EU states and the old ones. The differences concern the economic potential, energy security, quality and maturity of infrastructure, which also affects the countries' geopolitical standing, as well as the cohesion and strength of the EU as a whole. The countries participating in the Three Seas Initiative (both the countries and the initiative are hereinafter referred to as the TSI-12) see the initiative as a method to fill the gap. The objective of this analysis is: an assessment of selected data (total population, land cover, GDP), the degree of energy dependence and infrastructure maturity of more developed EU member states, whether they joined the union before or after 2004; and a presentation of the TSI-12 as a method which might contribute to eliminating the development differences referred to above, including an assessment of the initiative's geopolitical implications. The objective has been achieved through:
-the identification of measures which, starting from 2014, have accompanied the implementation of the "vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace" 4 ; -a comparative analysis of selected data 5 on the member countries of 6 : the EU-28, TSI-12, not-TSI-12 EU countries (hereinafter referred to as the EU-16), including ratios and indicators describing the energy dependence of the EU-28 as a whole, as well as of the EU-16 and TSI-12 separately 7 ; -a comparative analysis of infrastructure competitiveness ratios for the and TSI-12, as such ratios were published in the Global Competitiveness Report 2017−2018 by the World Economic Forum;
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The Three Seas Initiative and its Economic and Geopolitical Effect on the European Union… -a presentation of the origins of the TSI-12, as well as the progress and results of the Dubrovnik, Warsaw and Bucharest Summits based on available press announcements, official documents and publications, the major part of which were prepared following Donald Trump's visit to Poland in 2017; -an analysis of the geopolitical aspects of the TSI-12 initiative.
Origins of the TSI-12
In November 2014, the "Completing Europe, from the North-South Corridor to Energy, Transportation, and Telecommunications Union" report 8 was issued. The report starts with some words which, while difficult for Europe, should be treated as not only a challenge but also an opportunity: "Europe is at an inflection point in its history. The vision of a Europe whole, free, and at peace is under pressure from within and outside its frontiers. (…) At the same time, the EU faces multiple external threats, including a resurgent Russia."
9 The report was officially presented at a high-level meeting in Brussels on March 24 th , 2015 10 . The vision of a "Europe whole and free" was originally presented by President George H. W. Bush in his speech given in Mainz, Germany, on May 31 st , 1989, and addressed to citizens and political leaders. The President said, "And for 40 years, the world has waited for the Cold War to end. And decade after decade, time after time, the flowering human spirit withered from the chill of conflict and oppression; and again, the world waited. However, the passion for freedom cannot be denied forever. The world has waited long enough. The time is right. Let Europe be whole and free."
11
The vision's objectives were aptly captured by Robert E. Hunter 12 : "When President George H. W. Bush presented his vision of a 'Europe whole and free and at peace', and President Bill Clinton created the architecture to pursue that vision, two goals were uppermost: take Central Europe permanently off the geopolitical chessboard and draw . At the meeting, the establishment of the TSI-12 was announced and the next meeting was convened for Dubrovnik.
The EU-28 and TSI-12 − population, land cover and GDP The first part of the analysis of the TSI-12 is a discussion of the participating countries' potential and a comparison of analysis findings with relevant data on the EU-28. As set forth in Table 1 2015 -509.70; in 2016 -511.28; and in 2017 -512.57 . The TSI-12 total population was: in 2015 -112.35; in 2016 -112.19; and in 2017 -112.06 . Over the period covered by the comparison, the total EU-28 population increased, while that of the TSI-12 decreased, which drives the following changes in the percent share of the TSI-12 in the EU-28 total population: 2015: 22.04%, 2016: 21.94% and 2017, as already given above: 21.86%
21 .
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The Three Seas Initiative and its Economic and Geopolitical Effect on the European Union… Among the TSI-12 countries, the largest 2016/2017 population decreases in percentage terms were recorded in Lithuania (-1.6%) and Latvia (-1.1%). The largest increase was recorded in Austria (0.7%), while the EU-28 average was 0.3%. The EU-28 real GDP per capita 24 was 25 : in 2015 -26,700; in 2016 -27,100; and in 2017 -27,700. Excluding Austria, the ratios for the TSI-12 countries were lower than for the EU-28. For Poland, they were: 2015 -10,900; 2016 -11,200; 2017 -11,800 .
EU-28/EU-16 and TSI-12 energy dependence (crude oil and natural gas)
The energy dependence of the EU and its member states is of the utmost importance, as it enables energy carrier suppliers to exert pressure on those states. It was, for instance, evidenced by the Ukraine-Russian Federation gas crisis, when in the first week of 2009 the dispute brought about drops in gas pressure. This induced some CEE states 22 Total population and GDP - data for 2017; land cover - data for 2015.
23 All Eurostat data was derived from the official Eurostat database. Available at: https://ec.europa.
eu/eurostat/data/database (accessed: 6.09.2018).
24 In euro.
25 Aggregated data for the EU-28 published by Eurostat is not the arithmetic mean of the real GDP per capita for all EU-28 member states. Therefore, the methodological consistency of the analysis renders it impossible to correctly calculate the real GDP per capita for the TSI-12 and compare the result thus obtained with Eurostat's data for the EU-28.
to make decisions to increase the capacity of gas storage facilities and gas interconnectors, and to enable reverse flow, that is, two-way gas pumping. This accelerated the implementation of 'North-South Corridor' initiatives, including LNG terminals in Świnoujście, Poland, and the Croatian Island of Krk.
Eurostat's data 26 shows that with respect to crude oil, the EU-28's energy dependence rose from 83.4% to 87.8% between 2007 and 2016. The dependence on gas supplies increased from 59.5% to 70.4% over the same period.
In 2017, the suppliers for crude oil were 27 Russia (30.0%), Norway (13.0%), Kazakhstan (7.9%), Iraq (6.9%), Nigeria (6.5%), Saudi Arabia (5.7%), other suppliers 28 (30.1%); and for gas, they were Russia (37.0%), Norway (37.0%), Algeria (12.7%), Qatar (5.6%) and other suppliers 29 (7.7%). The data reveals that in 2017, Russia was the largest crude oil supplier to the EU-28, and together with Norway was one of the two largest gas suppliers with equal shares. Thus, it appears to be of key importance to present the dependence of the EU-16 and TSI-12 on crude oil and natural gas supplies from Russia.
The findings of the analysis of the Eurostat data 30 are as follows: Figure 1 reveals that in the case of crude oil in 2017: a) 68.75% of the EU-16 states fall in the 0−25% dependency range, 18.75% of them in the range 25−50%, 6.25% in the range 50−75% and 6.25% in the range 75−100%; b) 33.33% of TSI-12 states fall in the 0−25% dependency range, 8.33% of them in the range 25−50%, 33.33% in the range 50−75% and 25% in the range 75−100%. The analysis shows that the EU-16 states are significantly less dependent on supplies of crude oil from Russia than the TSI-12 states are. Figure 2 illustrates the following figures concerning the dependence on natural gas supplies in 2017: a) 68.75% of the EU-16 states fall in the 0−25% dependency range, 12.50% of them in the range 25−50%, 12.50% in the range 50−75% and 6.25% in the range 75−100%; b) 8.33% of the TSI-12 states fall in the 0−25% dependency range, 0% (none) of them in the range 25−50%, 16.67% in the range 50−75% and 75% in the range 75−100%. Again, the analysis shows that the EU-16 states are significantly less dependent on supplies of gas from Russia than the TSI-12 states are, and also that TSI-12 states' dependence is very large. Thus, the measures taken by the TSI-12 with a view to diversifying gas supplies are justified.
26 EU-28 energy dependence - total oil and gas as percent share of imports in total energy carrier consumption. According to Eurostat: the indicator shows the share of total inland energy needs met by imports from other countries.
27 Extra-EU imports of crude oil/natural gas, main trading partners' shares in total value.
28 Not specified by Eurostat.
29 Ibidem.
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EU-16/TSI-12 infrastructure competitiveness
Given that the TSI-12 states 31 were previously the Soviet Union's CEE satellite states, their infrastructure is poorer than the infrastructure developed post-WW2 in Western Europe. Infrastructure projects are, by their very nature, capital-and time-consuming as aptly described in the Atlantic Council and PwC's 2017 report 32 : "Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) has made unprecedented progress after decades of underinvestment … But the gap is still significant -a citizen of the 'old EU' has on average twice as many kilometers of motorways to drive on than his/her counterpart in CEE." The scale of capital expenditure needs is shown by the following remark: "Almost EUR 210 billion has been spent on transport infrastructure in CEE EU member states over the past 20 years… Five key TEN-T corridors play a paramount role for the Three Seas region (North Sea-Baltic, Baltic-Adriatic, Rhine Danube, Orient/East-Med and Mediterranean) -more than EUR 384 billion across over 2,000 projects is still needed to complete them." For this analysis, the comparison of the EU-16 infrastructure with the TSI-12 infrastructure was based on data prepared by the World Economic Forum and included in the Global Competitiveness Report 2017−2018 33 . Figure 3 shows that in each category covered by the comparison, the quality of EU-16 infrastructure is better than that of TSI-12 infrastructure. It shows that for the EU-16, individual infrastructure types are rated as follows: electricity supply − 6.28, air transport − 5.65, ports − 5.35, roads − 5.16, railroads − 4.86 and overall infrastructure − 5.56. Meanwhile, for the TSI-12, the respective ratings are as follows: electricity supply − 5.71, air transport − 4.51, roads − 4.22, ports − 4.21, railroads − 3.78, overall infrastructure − 4.60. The findings of the analysis corroborate the statement that, apart from diversifying the supply sources of energy carriers, one of the TSI-12's top priorities is investment projects providing for the development of necessary infrastructure (including power infrastructure). Given the volume limitations to which this paper is subject, this study omits the TSI-12's third priority, digital communication. Figure 3 shows that in each category covered by the comparison, the quality of EU-16 infrastructure is better than that of TSI-12 infrastructure. It shows that for the EU-16, individual infrastructure types are rated as follows: electricity supply − 6.28, air transport − 5.65, ports − 5.35, roads − 5.16, railroads − 4.86 and overall infrastructure − 5.56. Meanwhile, for the TSI-12, the respective ratings are as follows: electricity supply − 5.71, air transport − 4.51, roads − 4.22, ports − 4.21, railroads − 3.78, overall infrastructure − 4.60. The findings of the analysis corroborate the statement that, apart from diversifying the supply sources of energy carriers, one of the TSI-12's top priorities is investment projects providing for the development of necessary infrastructure (including power infrastructure). Given the volume limitations to which this paper is subject, this study omits the TSI-12's third priority, digital communication.
Arrangements of individual TSI Summits
Dubrovnik Forum 2016
35 According to the notes to the Report: "Rating based on a survey by the World Economic Forum, using a scale from 1 (extremely underdeveloped) to 7 (extensive and efficient). EU value is 
Arrangements of individual TSI Summits Dubrovnik Forum 2016
As agreed at the Grand Hyatt Hotel in 2015, and on August 25 th and 26 th 2016 in Dubrovnik, Croatia, the "Strengthening Europe by Connecting North and South" Forum was held, attended by representatives of the TS-12 states, as well as the USA, China and Turkey 35 . The first day of the event concluded with the TSI-12 representa-34 According to the notes to the Report: "Rating based on a survey by the World Economic Forum, using a scale from 1 (extremely underdeveloped) to 7 (extensive and efficient). EU value is calculated as a simple average". North-South axis instead of the East-West one; -expanding the existing cooperation in the areas of energy, transport, digital communication and economy sectors, which will strengthen the European Union as a whole; -implementing the initiative without a new parallel structure, with the use of existing EU and transatlantic cooperation mechanisms; -the TSI-12's openness to partnerships with those entities all over the world which respect the EU's values and principles; -a statement which reads: "The Three Seas Initiative is an informal platform to strengthen the overall political, economic, infrastructure and security cooperation in the authentic Central Europe. The goal of the Initiative is to establish a framework for decisive action in garnering and securing political support for specific cross-border strategic projects of interest to the States involved."
37
During his speech at the Forum, General James L. Jones, Jr. set directions for the TSI-12: "strengthening the security and resilience of northern, central, and eastern Europe -and by extension all of Europe and the transatlantic community, … to consider developing an even bolder vision to link the European Union to the wider European space …, the importance of the participation of the private sector in the TSI and the need for political leaders in the Three Seas Area and the EU to foster business conditions and policy clarity needed to generate private sector investment." 
Warsaw Summit 2017
On July 6 th and 7 th 2017, in Warsaw, the Warsaw Summit was held under the banner reading: "Connectivity, commerciality, complementarity." The Forum was attended by representatives of all 12 member states, as well as the US President 40 . Compared with the Dubrovnik Forum 2016, four more TSI-12 states were represented by their presidents, which brought the total number of TSI-12 presidents present to ten. A major reason was undoubtedly the US President's visit to Warsaw just before the G20 Summit in Hamburg. It is worth noting that President Trump's speech at the Summit "was the first programmatic, public speech devoted to international affairs after [his inauguration] as President of the USA" (Wiśniewski 2017, p. 28). We also have to bear in mind that the TSI objectives are consistent with the US Administration's strategy for building Post-Cold War Europe, mentioned in Section 2 hereof. With respect to economic cooperation, President Trump said in Krasiński Square: "And we are committed to securing your access to alternate sources of energy, so Poland and its neighbors are never again held hostage to a single supplier of energy."
41
It is an interesting conclusion that, since then, we can speak of the "American and CEE partnership" (Wiśniewski 2017, p. 28). Certain analogies here arise to the "Polish and German partnership" described in the literature, but a discussion of this issue would go beyond the scope hereof.
The key arrangements of the TSI-12 Warsaw Summit repeat those reached in Dubrovnik to a large extent. However, the Warsaw Summit declaration is approximately twice as long, and more often refers to complementarity, cohesion and support of the EU's initiatives. Moreover, it is here that, for the first time, some explicit statements are voiced which were absent from the Dubrovnik Summit declaration: "the 3 Seas Initiative has the following priorities: enhanced transportation connections of our region to develop and further integrate into the trans-European transport (TEN-T) network, implementation of the Union's Energy policy objectives, promote business character of joint economic projects, full synergy with the EU policies; Hereby agree that the 3 Seas Initiative is a useful platform that adds to an efficient and cohesive European Union. The development of cooperation among the 3 Seas states is contributing to the development of the entire European Union, which will, as a result, remain ambitious, united and resilient as a whole" 42 . It was also resolved (and included in the declaration) to enhance political meetings with the "3 Seas Business Forum".
Bucharest Summit 2018
As arranged in 2017, on September 17 th and 18 th , 2018, the Bucharest Summit took place in the capital of Romania. The summit was attended by representatives of the 12 TSI states, as well as the EU and the USA 43 . In the accompanying "3 Seas Business Forum," representatives of other countries, think tanks, chambers of commerce, economic organizations and individual companies also participated 44 . While the Bucharest Summit's arrangements confirm the political direction approved in Dubrovnik and Warsaw, the third summit was "focused on deliverables which will also enhance the value-added of the Initiative."
45 Accordingly, having repeated the Dubrovnik and Warsaw arrangements, the Bucharest documents firmly emphasize concrete projects, results and deliverables 46 . Additionally, the 3SI Business Forum was set as a regular annual event to monitor the implementation of the shortlisted projects
47
. Simultaneously, the 3SI Network of the Chambers of Commerce of the TSI-12 countries was established, as was the Three Seas Investment Fund. On September 17 th , 2018, two documents were signed: the Joint Statement for the creation of the Network of the Chambers of Commerce of the "Three Seas Initiative" 48 and the Letter of Intent in relation to the Three Seas Investment Fund. Such an approach strongly supports the implementation of the assumptions and objectives of TSI-12, as expenditure on the implementation of the initiative is an extremely material issue (Ukielski 2016, p. 37).
TSI-12 geopolitical aspects
Despite the widely declared economic nature of the TSI-12, the initiative is also said to have geopolitical objectives, which appears to reflect the facts. If the TSI-12 countries reduce their energy dependence on Russia, the latter will not be able to exert such a large influence on those countries (for instance, it will not be able to use 'gas blackmail'), which will also strengthen the entire EU. This is aptly rendered in the following statement: "while officially the Three Seas Initiative's objectives are economic, most participating states and numerous other countries see its principal objective as another strategic step towards safety: closing the ranks in the face of threats from the East" (Popescu 2017, p. 37) . The TSI-12 is also referred to as a response to challenges and threats originating in Poland's international environment (Sienkiewicz 2016, p. 143) . Quite naturally, the question arises regarding the TSI-12's effect on Nord Stream 2, which has already gone from concept development to implementation on both the German and Russian sides. This is perhaps the reason for Germany's reserved approach to the initiative. However, before the Bucharest Summit, Germany requested to be included in TSI-12 work as a partner state. The TSI-12 is in its entirety a project unifying and strengthening the EU, despite it being sometimes presented differently, as seen in the following statement: "It has been seen as building 'Plan B' for the EU or a project competing with Germany's initiatives" (Gniazdowski 2017, p. 79) . It appears, though, that "the Berlin political circles showed concern that the Three Seas Initiative is an attempt at establishing a political block which would compete with the 'old Europe' with a view to destroying the existing system in which Germany and France have had particularly strong positions and been able to successfully play off the incoherent Central and Eastern Europe" (Orzelska-Stączek 2018, p. 161). We have to bear in mind that the EU is not the CEE states on the one side and Brussels on the other, but a union of all 28 member states; and that the EU can be strong as a whole if the TSI-12 countries are allowed to reach the level of economic development (including infrastructure) of the EU-16 countries and the structure and diversification of oil and gas supplier base of the TSI-12 is similar to that of the EU-16.
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Conclusion
This paper's research hypothesis: "The CEE states' joining the EU has not markedly changed those states' development, as material differences do still exist in this respect between the new EU states and the old ones" has been proved true. The TSI-12 does help to fill those development gaps. It is both an economic and geopolitical initiative supporting the realization of the vision of a strong Europe actually unified and thus able to be free. The current scope of individual TSI-12 countries' dependence on gas supplies from Russia hinders the implementation of this vision, as it exposes the TSI-12 countries to the risk of gas blackmail. With each subsequent TSI-12 summit (in Dubrovnik, Warsaw and Bucharest), the project objectives have become more and more detailed, and the project itself has matured from the planning phase into the implementation phase, while the initiative has drawn increasing global attention, which manifests itself in the growing profile of the guests. In terms of the policy for energy carriers, of whom the EU is a net importer, the supplier base should be enhanced so that no supplier has a dominant position. This would enable the EU to hold a good position in negotiating the prices of energy carriers. The current relations between the US and European countries economically involved in Iran are far from good, owing to new US sanctions against Iran. Nor does such a state of affairs help the "US-CEE partnership." On the other hand, the TSI-12 should first focus on implementing the initiative's internal projects, and only later consider including other non-EU-28 countries in the cooperation.
